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In Britain, international migrants have very recently become the major workforce in labour-intensive 
agriculture. This paper explores the causes of the dramatic increase since the 1990s in the employment of 
migrant workers in this sub-sector. It locates this major change in a general pattern of intensification in 
agricultural production related to an ongoing process of concentration in retailer power, and in the greater 
availability of migrant workers, shaped in part by state initiatives to manage immigration. However, within 
this narrative of change at the national scale, the paper also finds continuing diversity in agricultural work-
place regimes. 
The paper draws on concepts developed in the US literature on agrarian capitalism. It then uses case 
histories from British agriculture to illustrate how growers have directly linked innovations involving 
intensification through labour control to their relationships with retailers. Under pressure on ‘quality’, volume 
and price, growers are found to have ratcheted up the effort required from workers to achieve the minimum 
wage through reducing the rates paid for piece work, and in some cases to have changed the type of labour 
contractor they use to larger, more anonymous businesses. The paper calls for further, commodity-specific  
and spatially-aware research with a strong ethnographic component.
 INTRODUCTION1 
In Britain, international migrants have very 
recently become the major workforce in the 
labour-intensive tasks of harvesting, packing and 
primary processing of relatively high value 
products such as fresh fruit, vegetables, salads 
and ornamental shrubs and flowers (Frances, 
Barrientos and Rogaly, 2005). This paper explores 
the causes of the dramatic increase since the 
1990s in the employment of migrant workers in 
this sub-sector. It locates this major change in a 
general pattern of intensification in agricultural 
production driven by an ongoing process of 
concentration in retailer power, and in the greater 
availability of migrant workers, shaped in part by 
state initiatives to manage immigration. However, 
within this narrative of change at the national 
scale, the paper also finds continuing diversity in 
agricultural work-place regimes.  
The roles of the state, of market relations (along 
the supply chain), and of local social and spatial 
relations in shaping work-place regimes across 
sectors have together been conceptualised as 
social regulation by Peck (1996). Social regulation 
has also been used specifically for the analysis of 
change in the agriculture and food sector.2 
Regulation is seen as being practiced at different 
scales and by a range of actors, including the 
local and national levels of the state, and private 
business interests. As Flynn and Marsden argue, 
“at a conceptual and empirical level, we can begin 
                                               
1 I am grateful to Bridget Anderson, Martin Ruhs and 
Sarah Spencer for permission to draw on data from our 
collaborative study ‘Changing Status, Changing Lives? 
The Socioeconomic Impact of EU Enlargement on Low-
Wage Migrant Labour in the UK’ (see 
www.compas.ox.ac.uk/changingstatus); to Stephanie 
Barrientos, Jennifer Frances and Jim Williams for the 
same in relation to our study on temporary working in 
UK agriculture and horticulture, see Frances, Barrientos 
and Rogaly (2005); to fellow interviewers Donna 
Crabtree, Lindsey Napier, Paula Tenaglia, Louise Waite 
and Benji Zeitlyn; to Stephanie Barrientos, Tanja Bastia, 
Richard Black, Russell King, Linda McDowell, Jeff Pratt, 
Kirat Randhawa, Martin Ruhs and Jane Wills for 
comments on an earlier draft; and to all the 
aforementioned as well as Henry Bernstein, Don Flynn, 
Zad Padda, Maria Pontes, Donna Simpson and Becky 
Taylor for conversations on some of the issues 
discussed in the paper. The views expressed here 
should not necessarily be attributed to any of them and 
all errors are mine. 
2 Flynn and Marsden (1995), Goodwin (2006), Lowe, 
Marsden and Whatmore (1994), Marsden and Arce 
(1995). 
to distinguish between more traditional regulatory 
styles based upon notions of the ‘public interest’ 
and an emergent private interest style of 
regulation” (op cit: 1185-86). In Britain a critical 
part of this movement towards regulation by 
private interests, has been the changing power 
relations among private actors, the “fundamental 
shift of power...in the food industry away from 
manufacturers to a small number of rapidly 
expanding retail corporations” (Marsden, Munton, 
Ward and Whatmore, 1996: 365 ).3 However, in 
spite of these perceptive analyses of the key ways 
in which private corporations and the state have 
influenced the production decisions of agricultural 
businesses in Britain, little attention has been paid 
to associated changes in agricultural work-places 
themselves, in the relations, that is, between 
wage workers, labour contractors, such as 
gangmasters, and grower and packer businesses.4  
In contrast, the role of the concentrated power of 
British retailers in social regulation of work-place 
relations has been analysed with respect to 
international agriculture, particularly with regard 
to the production of fresh fruit and vegetables in 
sub-Saharan Africa (eg. Barrientos and Kritzinger 
2004; Dolan 2004; Kritzinger, Barrientos and 
Rossouw,  2004). The methodological approach of 
such studies in food and agriculture has been 
inspired by the seminal work of Gereffi (1994) in 
relation to manufacturing supply chains. These 
studies have shown that supply chains have 
become increasingly ‘buyer-driven’, with retailers 
(the buyers) exerting power over the rest of the 
chain, and have drawn out the impact of these 
changes on relations between wage workers, 
growers and labour contractors at the point of 
production. ‘Farm to fork’ studies of particular 
products have also been valuable in elucidating 
the commodity-specific dynamics of such chains 
(Cook 2004; Daviron and Ponte 2005; Hughes 
and Reimer 2004; Pritchard and Curtis 2004)5. 
It is only in relation to the US that a large body of 
literature exists connecting social regulation by 
large-scale capital and the state with changing 
work-place regimes in labour-intensive domestic 
                                               
3 See also Lang and Heasman (2004), Wrigley (1987).   
4 Though a small number of other studies have focused 
on this. See, for example, Frances and Garnsey (1996), 
Lawrence (2004), Pai (2004), Pollard (2006). The UK 
does, of course, have its own literature on agricultural 
employment relations, including Collins (1976), Grieco 
(1996), Howkins (1990), Johnson (1967) and Newby 
(1977).  
5 For a two-part review of some of this recent work in 
commodity studies, see Bernstein and Campling (2006a 
and b). 
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agriculture.6 In this paper, I draw on some of the 
conceptual advances made by these studies to 
raise questions about changing work-place 
regimes in British agriculture. I make use in 
particular of the extensions by Guthman (2004) 
and Henderson (1998) of Mann’s theory regarding 
the natural obstacles to agrarian capitalism. These 
shed light on the processes by which value is 
captured by capital outside as well as within 
agricultural wage labour processes. Even in a 
climate of global concentration in the grocery 
retail sector, this is of particular importance in 
Britain, where concentration of supermarket 
power has been greater than in other northern 
countries (Flynn, Marsden and Ward, 1994:93; 
Morgan, Marsden and Murdoch, 2006; Vorley 
2003).7 This article represents a first attempt to 
analyse the connection in Britain between retail 
concentration and work-place intensification 
through the employment of foreign nationals.  
CAPITALISM IN HORTICULTURAL 
SUPPLY CHAINS 
How capital reproduces itself and accumulates in 
agriculture and horticulture is in part a matter of 
definition. For Mann (1990), the defining feature 
of capitalist labour relations is the use of hired 
wage labour.8 It is the surplus value of this labour 
which accrues to capital. Mann deploys this 
concept of capitalism to explain the obstacles 
facing capitalist investment in agricultural 
production and thus why ‘family farms’, not based 
on the use of wage labour, persist. Mann’s theory, 
an extension of Mann and Dickinson (1978), is 
undergirded by Marx’s notion of the nonidentity of 
production time and labour time in agriculture, 
                                               
6 These include, among many others, Friedland, Barton 
and Thomas (1981), Henderson (1998), Martin (1988; 
2002), McWilliams (1945), Mitchell (1996), and Wells 
(1996). 
7 The dominance of national retailers in the food supply 
chain made Britain “crucially distinctive” Flynn, Marsden 
and Ward (1994). Until recently, power in the US 
supply chain lay with large-scale processors and 
manufacturers rather than retailers, although the 
concentration of retail power in the US has been 
catching up with that in Britain (Wrigley, 2002). 
8 Henderson argues that this definition is contested 
around two axes. Firstly, for some writers, a farm is 
capitalist if it sells a certain proportion of its product. It 
does not necessarily have to involve wage labor. 
Secondly, it can be argued that even when production 
is non-capitalist by both the market sales and the wage 
labor criteria, if money “can be plowed back into the 
farm from elsewhere, making the farm an instrument 
for capitalist exploitation and a site among others for 
circulation,” the agriculture concerned is therefore 
capitalist (op cit: 29). 
the associated periods of idleness (of labour and 
machinery) and the resulting slower turnover of 
capital, than in, say, manufacturing industry. 
Moreover, because of the perishability and 
shrinkage of certain crops, there is more limited 
potential for storage as a response to price and 
demand fluctuations than with non-perishable 
products.  As suggested by Guthman, this often 
makes growers into price-takers (2004: 65). 
Taken together these factors limit the value that 
can be accumulated by capital from agricultural 
production processes.  
More recent work, including Guthman’s, locates 
capital accumulation in agriculture away from the 
production site, for example through lending 
money to growers (Henderson, op cit) and 
marketing agricultural produce. Such processes 
fall within Guthman’s concept of “appropriation” 
(op cit: 66). Guthman holds that in response to 
the obstacles to capitalist accumulation in 
agricultural production, innovation takes place in 
context-specific ways through three sometimes 
simultaneous processes:  appropriation, 
valorisation and intensification. Appropriation is 
the investment in specific non-farm activities that 
“[extract] value from others” (ibid: 66). It may 
involve input manufacture, food processing or 
marketing, including appropriation of value by 
corporate retailers (Morgan, Marsden and 
Murdoch, op cit: 121) “In effect, the labour value 
farmers add (as well as value extracted from 
nature) is shifted to nonfarm industry” (Guthman: 
loc cit). Valorisation involves “seeking value 
through the realm of consumption......finding new 
ways of enhancing the desire for the product 
itself” (loc cit). This has special salience for 
organics, in relation to which, at the conjuncture 
of the late 1990s/ 2000s in California, 
“valorisation appear[ed] the more lucrative 
avenue” (ibid: 67). 
Here, however, I am mainly concerned with the 
third form of innovation, intensification. 
Importantly for the analysis that follows, Guthman 
argues not only that intensification is “broadly 
characterised by efforts to speed up, enhance or 
reduce the risks of biological processes” but that 
“even some nontechnical innovations in labor 
control can be considered intensification..., for 
example, the use of vulnerability to ensure a 
timely and compliant labor force come 
harvesttime” (ibid: 65, emphasis added).  
The research reported in the section that follows 
is aimed at unpacking such innovations in labour 
control, in particular the use of foreign nationals 
in the workforce. It examines the extent to which 
such intensification is connected to the relation 
between retailers and growers. The analysis 
makes use of the concept of work-place regime, 
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which encompasses the whole set of labour 
arrangements9 made, largely by employers, with 
varying degrees of negotiation with labour 
contractors and workforces, and in response to 
wider labour market, legal and commercial 
conditions. These arrangements include decisions 
about whom to employ with regard to nationality, 
immigration status, gender, age and skills. From 
the perspective of employers, particular kinds of 
worker may be considered suitable because of 
their acquiescence to (or compliance with) tasks 
set and working norms, their degree of 
willingness to commit to a pre-determined 
programme of work (or alternatively to come to 
work without pre-set end times), and the ease of 
disposing of them when they are no longer 
needed. The arrangements also involve decisions 
over whether workers are employed by a labour 
contractor (gangmaster), or directly by the 
grower, the conditions of work and divisions of 
labour between roles and between work-sites and 
how much room for manoeuvre exists in practice 
for workers to move between them; the amount, 
form and basis for remuneration (piece rate or 
time rate, weekly or daily, cash or electronic); 
accommodation and transport arrangements 
where relevant; hours and days of work for each 
worker and the degree of control the worker, 
labour contractor and grower have over them; 
methods of supervision and quality control; 
informal and formal relations between individual 
workers, groups of workers, labour contractors 
and the grower.  
I focus on three aspects of changing work-place 
regimes in contemporary British agriculture, which 
may be expected to indicate intensification: the 
employment of international migrant workers, the 
‘return of the gangmaster’ (Brass, op cit), and the 
use of piece rates. 10 All three can be interpreted 
as nontechnical innovations in labour control of 
the kind identified by Guthman, that use 
vulnerability to ensure compliance in the labour 
force. Evidence which follows does indeed 
suggest that all three are indicators of 
intensification. However, as we shall see, care is 
required in interpreting this because of the 
diversity of interests involved. 
The main sources of data for this paper are case 
histories. Faced with the daunting prospect of 
accounting for diversity between regions, 
                                               
9 See Rogaly (1996). 
10 This paper is primarily about waged labor in labor-
intensive worksites and it does not analyse the gender 
division of labor within grower households, nor the 
important role of ‘unpaid’ work (in spite of the warnings 
of Marsden et al, 1987, op cit, fn 1). 
commodities and types and sizes of grower 
businesses in processes of agricultural 
restructuring, Marsden, Whatmore and Munton 
(1987) called for the use of case histories in order 
to be able to account for multiple causes of 
change and to suggest prevailing patterns. While 
they cannot be representative, the depth involved 
in case histories is particularly insightful for the 
understanding of processes. The case histories 
referred to in what follows are based on face-to-
face interviews carried out in 2004 with thirteen 
businesses in British agricultural/ horticultural 
production and one involved in first-stage 
processing. I spent two days on-site with the 
latter company and with three grower businesses 
(involved respectively in the supply of salad 
onions, strawberries and hardy shrubs), 
interviewing five directors, seven managers, five 
labour contractors and thirty-six workers. This 
approach meant that it was possible to take 
account of workers’ as well as employers’ 
perspectives. However, there were important 
limitations. Interviews with workers, though 
conducted behind closed doors, were mostly 
coordinated by company managers or directors 
who selected workers from the field or packhouse 
for the interviews. In contrast, all nine of the 
other grower interviews were tape recorded and 
transcribed.11  
In what follows, therefore, greater attention is 
paid to employers’ (including labour contractors’) 
perspectives and the ‘logic of capital’. This 
contributes to addressing the lacuna of such 
analysis in migration studies, as highlighted by 
Krissman (2005). Krissman argues that 
mainstream studies have focused almost entirely 
on the supply side, sustaining policy responses 
that emphasise greater policing of international 
borders. This in turn makes migrant workers more 
desirable to employers than they would be if all 
were regularised. In contrast, according to 
Krissman, a greater research focus on the 
practices of employers and labour contractors in 
hiring migrants would lead to a stronger case for 
regulating capital. 
                                               
11 These nine interviews, five of which I carried out 
myself, formed part of a larger study coordinated by 
the Centre for Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) 
at the University of Oxford, see Ruhs, Anderson, Rogaly 
and Spencer (2006). The four case studies, 
coordination of which was assisted by Paula Tenaglia, 
also formed part of a larger study, commissioned by 
the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (see Frances, Barrientos and Rogaly, op cit).  
The names of interviewees referred to in this paper 
have been anonymised. 
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As this paper suggests, with respect to agriculture 
such an agenda should not be concerned with the 
practices of growers and labour contractors alone, 
but also with the companies that buy their 
products. The case histories drawn on here are 
suggestive of the importance of relations between 
different branches of capital in driving the 
intensification of work-place regimes. They are 
deliberately taken from a range of businesses that 
have (so far) survived in the cut-throat world of 
retail supply of fresh fruit, vegetables, salads and 
ornamentals in contemporary Britain.  
INTENSIFICATION OF BRITISH 
AGRICULTURAL WORK-PLACE 
REGIMES 
Switching to foreign nationals in the work-force 
 
‘A large number of those employed by the 
undersellers are foreigners and youths, who are 
obliged to accept almost any wages they can 
obtain’ (Marx 1867 (1976): 690-1) 
 
International migrant workers in British 
agriculture long predate the arrival of corporate 
retailers. Employers regarded them as  
“indispensable”, for example, in the middle of the 
nineteenth century (Collins, 1976: 55). Demand 
varied according to crop and region, and between 
years.12 It “was most exceptional, in, for example, 
the Fens (where the tongues were once described 
as being as many as the ‘builders of Babel’) and 
the Kent hop-fields, which polarised the labour 
markets over whole regions and attracted every 
manner and nationality of itinerant worker" (ibid: 
43). Seasonal migration by Irish workers was 
particularly common (Johnson, 1967).13   
                                               
12 The employment of women and child workers was 
common, the breakdown of the workforce by age and 
sex being time and place specific (contrast, for 
example, the “travelling bands of [harvest] workmen” 
in central England with the “women and girl harvesters” 
in the Scottish highlands (Collins, op cit: 45 and 47)). 
Whole families from south-east London were hired for 
hop-picking in Kent up until the 1960s (Grieco, 1996). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in the last decades 
of the twentieth century, and prior to the acceleration 
in employment of foreign nationals (men and women), 
the seasonal casual workforce involved in fruit, 
vegetable and flower harvesting was predominantly 
made up of women (and children) (see also Brass, op 
cit: 321).   
13 Moreover, it is not only in contemporary British 
agriculture that employers complain about the attitude 
Since the 1990s, there has been a general 
increase in the employment of foreign nationals 
across economic sectors in Britain (Anderson, 
Ruhs, Rogaly and Spencer, op cit: 6). However, a 
recent comparison of employers’ use of migrant 
labour in five sectors found that the structure of 
demand in agriculture had particular 
characteristics (Dench, Hurstfield, Hill and Akroyd, 
2006)14. Firstly, the preference for migrant 
workers was much stronger in agriculture, 
secondly, only in agriculture did employers 
unequivocally see migrant workers as “crucial” to 
their businesses,  and thirdly agricultural 
employers were the most hostile to the phasing 
out of temporary migration schemes under the 
British government’s new points-based system 
(ibid: 34, 35 and 70).15 
Our case histories suggest that, while there has 
been a decline in the availability of long term 
residents, including British nationals, and an 
increase in migrant workers willing to work in the 
sector, the main reason for this structure of 
demand lies in the relations between growers and 
retailers. The buyer-driven structure of the 
horticultural supply chain has enabled retailers to 
appropriate ever greater value from agricultural 
producers.16 This has meant declining margins 
available for growers on each unit of output. 
Many producers of fresh fruit and vegetables have 
gone out of business, as evidenced by the 
shrinking and increasingly concentrated structure 
of the fresh fruit and vegetable sectors (Key Note 
2004). Others have sought what they saw as the 
only viable way forward: to supply greater 
volumes, through intensifying production and 
becoming involved in the packing and primary 
processing not only of their own products, but 
also of imports.17  
                                                                        
and application of fellow nationals in their employment 
(for a US example, see Martin, 1988, op cit:5) 
14 The other sectors studied by Dench et al were 
construction; administration, business and 




points-based-migration?view=Binary accessed 21st July 
2006. 
16 Competition Commission (2000), Lawrence (2004). 
17 Still others switched into horticulture, combining 
intensification with valorisation. As one former cereals 
grower put it, “we have intensified our business to try 
and retain financial viability.....The growing of a greater 
proportion of vegetable crops...require[s] greater 
financial input but they also require greater input in 
other areas too. One of which is the labor involved, to 
have some weeding and harvesting. And sometimes 
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‘Quality’ has been at least as important as volume 
and price in the governance of retailer-supplier 
relations.18 The 1990 Food Safety Act effectively 
enshrined in statute regulation by retailers of the 
phytosanitary conditions of production and 
packing. Quality has also come to be used to refer 
to the increasingly precise standardisation of size, 
shape, texture and colour. This has influenced 
change in work-place regimes aimed at 
intensifying workers’ effort in harvesting and 
packing only those products that fulfilled the 
criteria. For example, some fruit growers now 
impose penalties on workers who consistently 
select fruit that do not satisfy the criteria. Growers 
are under particular pressure if they do not have 
their own packhouse, as the packhouse owners 
can reject produce on ‘quality’ grounds, when 
there is a surplus of fruit.  Interviews revealed 
how the supermarket governance of the chain 
through the language of ‘quality’ fed through into 
a demand by growers for particular ‘qualities’ in 
the workforce. In particular, workers were sought 
who would be reliable, flexible and compliant. For 
the growers we interviewed, all these ‘qualities’ 
were seen as more likely to be found in foreign 
workers.  
Several growers described a shift from employing 
British nationals (including local workers, 
Travellers19 and longer distant commuters), to 
increasingly greater use of  foreign nationals.  
This is exemplified by the testimony of one 
vegetable grower in the East Midlands: 
“If I go back to when I first started 
farming sort of the 1970s down here 
there were a lot of women were carrot 
picking and parsnip picking and doing 
jobs like that. Incredibly tough ladies you 
know they really were.... They were great 
characters....”  
                                                                        
planting or establishing crops too.” (Director, East 
Midlands grower, April 2004). While there were no 
subsidies available for horticultural crops, growers had 
faced continuing decline in the subsidies they received 
for cereals and livestock production through the 
European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and diminishing influence over British politics (see 
Flynn, Lowe and Winter, 1996).  
18 See Ponte and Gibbon (2005) and Murdoch, Marsden 
and Banks (2000) for a critical literature on the use of 
such ‘quality’ criteria in the governance of supply 
chains. 
19 Travellers worked along side rural and urban laborers 
in fruit and vegetable farms on the Welsh borders, in 
Scottish berry fields and picking hops in Kent and 
Hampshire (Taylor, forthcoming; Whyte, 1979). 
The question of who worked in these jobs began 
to change about ten years ago for a number of 
reasons.  
“Number one is that the farming 
community were reducing their 
permanent labour because of the financial 
pressure they were under. So, part of this 
work would have been done by full time 
staff in the past. And so there was a 
casual labour requirement for peak 
periods of time, and even then the people 
coming in would have been from local 
areas, they might have been travelling in 
ten, twenty miles but it was no more than 
that each day. And then we saw the 
transition to, I suppose, deprived, 
relatively deprived, city areas....that was 
hard work. It really was. 
“...they always basically want[ed] to do 
as little as possible for as much as 
possible and they thought it was 
demeaning work. I think they felt that we 
felt that they were inferior citizens 
basically which of course is absolute 
nonsense.... I think one of the reasons 
why the Eastern Europeans have come 
and work so well is because they do have 
somewhat higher intellect and their 
understanding, OK, even the language 
scenarios, of what we’re after and what 
our marketplace is after, and also the fact 
that unless the job is done well, there 
really isn’t any point in doing it, seems to 
be very much greater than the people 
who were coming from ...you know, 
Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire and places 
like that. And I think I suppose it comes 
back to background. I mean it’s an 
obvious thing in terms of the life that 
they’ve led and the requirements of that 
life and they just seem to be quite happy 
to sort of buckle down and we find them 
lovely people we really do. I mean you 
know it’s once you’ve got over any initial 
misunderstandings about what the job’s 
about they are consistently capable of 
producing high quality. With the English 
cauliflower harvesters that we used to use 
we’d be fighting a battle to try and 
maintain quality and that’s hard 
work....whereas with the eastern 
Europeans, generally, once we’ve set a 
standard they will stick with it.......[We 
can] rely on them to produce quality”  
(Director, East Midlands grower, April 
2004) 
A second East Midlands grower (a producer of 
salad leaves) explained how supermarket-driven 
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intensification had lead that company from using 
commuters (British nationals) to foreign nationals 
employed under the Seasonal Agricultural 
Workers Scheme (SAWS)20: 
“There is a two way street...I am happy 
to be a [supplier to the supermarkets] 
and it’s what has given us opportunity. I 
get people trying to force you to go 
down. Anyway, so the driver is certainly 
the quality of work and we were finding it 
difficult to source good regular labour”. 
This company changed its work-place 
regime, including the switch to foreign 
nationals because “we are talking about 
wanting people to work for us from March 
to the end of November, whereas prior to 
that we had gangs in to do work but they 
would be much shorter duration....The 
way we used to work, if it was wet they 
didn’t come. We are a different game 
now. We’ve got certain customers 
everyday. Weather isn’t an issue.” 
“I think the other thing was there was a 
throw back to the miners’ strike.....there 
were lots of areas certainly around 
Sheffield where a lot of people were 
screaming out for work at that time, and 
this is why we got a lot of people out of 
those areas at that particular time....[But] 
these people used to come at half past 
eight and go about half past two or three 
o’clock which was a very short day, and in 
terms of what we’re doing now we need a 
longer working day”  
(Director, East Midlands grower, April 
2004) 
Growers of other crops in other regions also made 
direct connections between the specifications 
made by the large retailers, and the nationality of 
workers that worked at their site. This sweetcorn 
grower in the south-east also made reference to 
the specific relation between nature and 
agricultural production (echoing Mann, op cit): 
“We wouldn’t have dared grow unless we 
could have solved the labour problem. If 
we couldn’t get the labour, we would 
have stopped instantaneously because we 
cannot compete [as employers] with 
baggage handlers at Gatwick, no way. I 
mean [in] our discipline we need to work 
on Sundays; people need to be at work 
                                               
20 A scheme providing temporary six-month work 
permits to non-European Union nationals currently 
registered as students outside the UK specifically for 
work in the agricultural sector. 
together so they all start at the same 
time; you can’t run a gang of four or five 
if two are missing and that’s what 
happens with the Brits. They go on the 
piss on a Saturday night and you wouldn’t 
see them on a Sunday. Absolutely 
hopeless.....You see our business has 
nearly all been supermarket business and 
delivering what you say you are going to 
do on time in the right this that and the 
other is absolutely essential. Without that 
you wouldn’t be asked to do anything for 
them...you need dead reliable people. I 
mean agriculture is very unforgiving. You 
can’t stop the clock.”  
(Director, South East grower, April 2004) 
There are several reasons why foreign nationals 
may be more vulnerable workers than British 
nationals, including both locally resident workers 
and longer distant commuters, and therefore why 
this growth in their use represents an important 
instance of intensification through innovation in 
work-place regimes. Firstly, there is the issue of 
immigration status. As in the US (Guthman op cit; 
Martin 2002; Wells op cit; Wells and Villarejo 
2004), state regulation played a critical role in the 
supply of foreign nationals to agriculture, creating 
a number of different immigration statuses. Each 
of these defined the rights to work and residence 
of the migrant workers concerned. In the British 
case, these included the status defined by the 
SAWS scheme and its predecessors (Kay and 
Miles 1992; Tenaglia 2004), the creation (Genova 
2002) of the ‘illegal immigrant’ (including people 
who overstayed or worked beyond the remit of 
their visas), and the opening of the UK labour 
market to accession country nationals from 2004.  
The SAWS quota grew from 5,500 permits at its 
inception in 1990 to 25,000 in 2004. This was 
reduced to 16,250 for 2005 because of the inflow 
of workers expected following EU enlargement. In 
the event, ten per cent of the 345,000 workers 
registering in employment as accession country 
nationals between enlargement on 1st May 2004 
and 31st December 2005 registered with 
employers in agriculture or fishing (Gilpin, Henty, 
Lemos, Portes and Bullen, 2006: 20).21 In general, 
vulnerability is likely to be  enhanced for workers 
                                               
21 Not all of these workers were entering Britain or 
employment in the agricultural sector at the time of 
registering. For workers already in place, the Workers 
Registration Scheme was a form of regularisation of 
their status. There was a skewed regional distribution 
of agriculture sector registrations with high proportions 
of total registrations being in this sector in Kent, the 
Marches, Norfolk, Lincolnshire, Cambridgeshire and the 
Grampians (loc cit).  
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employed outside the terms of their immigration 
status. It is much riskier for such workers to try to 
seek redress (Anderson and Rogaly, 2005).  
A second important source of vulnerability for 
foreign nationals is lack of information. They may 
in fact have the right to work, to move jobs and 
to be employed in any sector but may not know 
that they do (Pontes, 2005). Lack of information 
is connected to the length of stay in the country 
and, in Britain, to English language skills. Indeed 
both these factors can in themselves operate to 
reduce vulnerability, as, through longer periods of 
residence, international migrants are likely to 
become more aware of their rights, the rules of 
the game, and commonly accepted ways of 
bending them (Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly and 
Spencer, op cit). English language skills have 
made it possible for international migrant workers 
to negotiate better within particular work-places: 
“it makes a big difference if you can 
speak English. If you talk with English 
people they will be happy. They will say 
morning and bye. You get better jobs. My 
boyfriend understands English - it is 
another thing to speak it [as I do]. He 
gets better jobs because of me. Some 
people have to work outside in the rain. 
At the break they are shivering. It’s not a 
pleasure. But me and my boyfriend have 
been under cover in the rain.”  
(Lithuanian gang worker, female, August 
2004) 
It is important to note therefore that vulnerability 
cannot be read off from immigration status. 
Furthermore, workers may be making trade-offs 
(ibid) between short term pain and long term 
gain, being willing to put up with the hard work 
and long and uncertain hours often involved in 
agricultural work in exchange for relatively high 
earnings (when converted into the currency 
operating in their home country) and/ or English 
language acquisition. Such conscious trade-offs 
are particularly likely to be the case for SAWS 
workers, who are university students and may 
have professional aspirations.  
A postal survey was conducted in 2005 and 
received returns from 120 agriculture and food 
processing employers.22 It found that labour costs 
averaged thirty per cent of total production costs 
(ibid: 68). Further, ‘work ethic’ was the most 
commonly given reason why employers in these 
sectors preferred migrants of particular 
nationalities (ibid: 78, Figure 3.3). As well as 
being valued for hard work, foreign nationals are 
                                               
22 See Ruhs, Anderson, Rogaly and Spencer (op cit). 
also used as enforcers of intensified work-place 
regimes: 
“We are also short of supervisors: people 
who can monitor quality, who can direct 
the jobs more, motivate workers, identify 
those workers who can be lost from the 
gang, de-employed. If we can find some 
of these, we may be able to get the most 
out of new immigrants”  
(Senior Manager, East ornamentals 
grower, August 2004)  
Foreign nationals have thus been used in different 
ways as instruments of newly intensified work-
place regimes in horticulture. In spite of the 
trade-offs this may have involved for workers, and 
the varying degrees of worker agency in the 
work-place, the growth in employment of foreign 
nationals in the sector has reflected above all a 
combination of  
i) regulation by the private interests of corporate 
retailers summed up by the transposition of a 
discourse of product quality into growers’ search 
for the right quality of worker;  
ii) state regulation of labour supply through 
migration policy; and  
iii) lack of effective state regulation of retailer-
supplier relations.   
However, the ways in which growers have 
intensified work-place regimes extend beyond the 
demand for particular kinds of workers. In the 
next sub-section I consider changes in the use of 
labour contractors and gang labour. 
Labour contractors (gangmasters) 
 
‘parasites.... interpos[ing] themselves between 
the capitalist and the wage-labourer, thus giving 
rise to the “sub-letting of labour”. The profits of 
these middlemen come entirely from the 
difference between the price of labour which the 
capitalist pays, and the part of that price they 
actually allow the worker to receive’ (Marx 1867 
(1976): 695) 
 
In Britain as elsewhere, there is a long history of 
using labour contractors as sources of temporary 
labour for harvest work and for other seasonal 
peaks in labour demand in agriculture.23 The 
demand by growers for the services of labour 
                                               
23 See, for example, Banaji, 1992; Brass, 2004; 
Churchill, 1990; Frances, 2003; Pollard, 2006; Wells, 
1996. 
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contractors derives in part from agriculture’s 
particular relation with nature. The mismatch 
between production time and labour time in 
labour intensive crop production make it 
economically unviable for a constant number of 
workers to be hired around the year. From a 
grower’s perspective, using labour contractors 
provides a means of adjusting numbers so that 
workers are available when required yet are not 
being paid when there is insufficient work. 
Moreover, labour contractors may be able to 
provide transport and supervision for the spatial 
stretch that is often involved in agricultural 
production. 
The presence of labour contractors is used as an 
indicator of exploitative labour relations by 
Guthman, who reveals that they are relied on 
heavily by organic growers in certain regions of 
California (op cit). Indeed if labour contractors 
hoard information about jobs and access to them, 
or, as is often the case in contemporary 
agriculture, provide the only means of transport 
available to the workplace, workers easily become 
dependent on them. This dependence can be 
magnified when contractors are also key providers 
of credit or of accommodation, the latter being 
especially important for newly arrived migrant 
workers, or when they are connected to 
international recruitment agencies. In Britain, lack 
of English can also be another cause for 
dependence on gangmasters or their staff.  
For growers who used them, gangmasters 
brought new opportunities for fine tuning their 
work-place regimes in response to supermarket 
demands. “They can easily be turned on and they 
can easily be turned off”.24 For a West Midlands 
salad onions grower, there was a direct 
connection between supermarket practices and 
the use of gang workers:  
“Walmart’s aggressiveness on price has 
forced other supermarkets to come down 
on price [too].” This company now has to 
run a “lean ship...the biggest problem is 
labour. It has gone beyond the 
English...[Moreover], you can’t get the 
‘gypsies’ to prepare the salad to the 
quality required now”.  
After Travellers, the company started to use 
Birmingham-based south Asians supplied by 
gangs.  
“It was a revelation that we could give an 
order on the afternoon before and labour 
would be there the next day. Also that 
                                               
24 large-scale lettuce grower, East of England, April 
2004. 
one could write out one cheque for all the 
labour rather than going through PAYE.... 
The crop has not really changed over the 
years. The change is that more 
preparation is needed. Supermarkets 
impose more quality standards - products 
must be the same size and length”  
(Director, West Midlands grower, August 
2004) 
Yet, as their long historical presence implies, the 
presence of labour contractors per se does not 
necessarily indicate work-place intensification. 
Rather, the case histories recorded in twenty-first 
century Britain are suggestive of changes in the 
type of gangmaster business consistent with an 
overall intensification of work-place regimes. If 
the need for labour co 
ntractors driven by the non-unity of labour time 
and production time does present an opportunity 
for capital accumulation, as Henderson (op cit) 
found it did for providers of loans and mortgages 
to farmers,  then this does not apply to all 
gangmasters.  Indeed a combination of new 
licensing legislation and downward pressure on 
overheads seemed to be causing older, smaller 
businesses to fold. 
In February 2004, the attention of government 
had turned to new legislation to regulate 
gangmasters, following the deaths of workers at 
Morecambe Bay, and the impetus that tragedy 
had given to the Private Members’ Bill aimed at 
the creation of a new licensing regime.25 An 
unlikely grouping of unions, supermarkets, non-
governmental organisations, employers 
organisations and government officials worked 
together on the Act under the auspices of the 
Ethical Trading Initiative’s Temporary Labour 
Working Group. Key to its success was the 
backing of the large supermarkets, who were 
vitally concerned with protecting their public 
image (and by extension their customer base and 
market share) (see Freidberg, 2004). As a result 
of the Act, the Gangmaster Licensing Authority 
was due to come into force in September 2006.26  
                                               
25 Introduced before Morecambe Bay by the Transport 
and General Workers’ Union sponsored MP, Jim 
Sheridan. 
26 Gangmaster licensing applies only to the following 
sectors: Agriculture, horticulture, processing and 
packaging of food, including fish, and shellfish 
gathering. At the time of writing 553 gangmasters had 
applied for licences and 401 had been received (figures 
extracted from public register, Gangmaster Licensing 
Authority website www.gla.gov.uk, accessed 21st July 
2006).  
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The new law made it an offence to use labour 
provided by an unlicensed gangmaster. So 
gangmasters increasingly had to show they were 
not cutting corners, for example on wage 
payments or non-wage benefits such as holiday 
pay, nor charging excess fees for transport, or 
exorbitant rents on accommodation. Gangmaster 
businesses were squeezed from another direction 
by growers facing ever tighter margins. Growers 
resisted paying a higher percentage fee per 
worker,27 while gangmasters saw that compliance 
with the new Gangmaster (Licensing) Act would 
cause their costs to rise.  
The gangmasters interviewed explained the 
pressures experienced by their businesses. All had 
once been gang workers themselves, and some 
still worked alongside the people they employed. 
Deep was the largest, supplying up to 400 
workers per day to do field-based harvesting and 
first stage processing as well as 40-45 workers for 
the packhouse at the salad onion grower site in 
the West Midlands. This grower, turnover   £7.2m 
in 2002-03, relied on Deep alone, a Birmingham-
based British citizen of south Asian heritage. 
Deep expressed frustration with the rates he 
received both for field and packhouse work. He 
was paid £4.90 per worker per hour for 
packhouse work. The workers received £4.5028. 
This was corroborated in interviews with two 
workers. The grower paid for fieldwork at a set 
price per box of salad onions harvested and 
prepared. According to Deep, although he used to 
make his money in the field rather than the 
packhouse, the rate paid per box for each grade 
of product had declined year on year (see next 
sub-section on piece-rates). He was concerned 
that the company would ask him to go down 
further on his unit price which he claimed he 
simply would not do. “The most important things 
is the price. I am not going to work for £15 to £20 
per day.” 
Kevin, a white British gangmaster providing 
labour to an east of England ornamentals 
company (turnover £6.5m in 2003-04), had 
inherited the business from his father twelve 
years earlier. The gang had shrunk from twenty-
four to eight core members. Kevin said he made 
his margins from holiday pay and appeared 
especially anxious about his business coming 
under official scrutiny. “When the new legislation 
comes in and gangmasters are investigated a bit 
more, that will be it, finished...I pay two weeks 
                                               
27 For another specific instance of this see Dench et al 
(op cit: 63). 
28 Equivalent to the then National Minimum Wage rate 
for adults. 
holiday pay when I ought to pay four.” Another 
source of pressure is the customer, the 
ornamentals company, which has refused to raise 
the overhead paid to Kevin from twenty-eight to 
thirty-three per cent. “I told him [the director] 
that both our fathers were now in the ground and 
that your father had been happy to pay my father 
thirty-three per cent...I will stop business if 
overheads don’t go up.” Kevin explained that the 
director also objected to the high turnover of the 
non-core workers in the gang, which was a 
strategy by Kevin to avoid reaching the minimum 
threshold for employer’s National Insurance 
contributions. The director told us he wanted 
“gangs to deliver regular, reliable people who 
come in daily.” But he was also aware that the 
employer’s national insurance contributions may 
represent the gangmaster’s margin. “You know 
and I know that the gangmaster can’t do 
everything correctly on twenty-eight per cent, if 
he is paying holiday pay etc.” 
Simon’s gang too, which was made up of women 
and men commuting daily from a former mining 
area in Yorkshire to work at an East Midlands fruit 
handling and brassica floreting company, had 
shrunk in recent years.  
“There was no other work in Yorkshire 
after the mines closed....In [this area] 
they couldn’t get people to work so they 
came up to our area to find workers.” 
Within two or three years Simon was 
advertising for workers in the local paper 
and became a gangmaster. “At that time 
it was very easy to get people to travel up 
and down from Yorkshire to [the East 
Midlands]. But now it is much harder. 
Over the past five years there have been 
more and more foreign workers coming to 
work.”  
(Simon, gangmaster, September 2004) 
When he had first started, Simon used to bring 
down sixty to a hundred people daily with a peak 
at Christmas. He would hire extra vehicles. Now 
he had just seven or eight workers and used his 
own vehicle. It had become more of a family 
group: Simon’s mother, brother and four others 
from the same village formed the core members 
of the gang. 
A fourth gang, working at the same ornamentals 
company as Kevin, and made up of white British 
men and women, had been formed by workers 
themselves. The gangmasters Helen and Alice 
faced pressure from the company’s attempt to 
fine-tune labour deployment. The gang had 
started as a worker-takeover: 
“I had been working for another 
gangmaster, an arsehole. I don’t like the 
 10
way he treated us. His father was a 
director of [names grower]. I was a single 
parent living in [a nearby village]. We 
[the gang workers] had a meeting in a 
shed and then asked [the ornamentals 
grower] whether we’d be guaranteed 
work [if we formed our own gang]. It was 
February 13th 1991 or 1992.”  
(Helen, gangmaster, August 2004) 
For Helen it was key that she and Alice worked 
alongside workers in their gang, although this had 
the downside that workers knew they could get 
their way. For example, if they kept nagging “can 
we have a fag break?” they would get it. The core 
group had known each other for a long time. 
Helen described how the manager  expected them 
to reduce their numbers as the season came to an 
end each September. “We have had to lay people 
off and we’ve felt terrible. The new senior 
manager, who had been recruited specifically to 
maximise the efficient use of labour, approached 
Alice and told her she had to lay off two specific 
workers that night. “And he wonders why they 
don’t come to work the following year.” 
In contrast, the new gangs were larger, often 
regional or even national operations, with multiple 
customers and gangmasters who were rarely seen 
at the work site. Instead, leaders were selected 
from the workforce provided to each company. 
While there is no evidence that this kind of 
gangmaster is any more or less likely to abuse 
workers, the case histories suggest they are more 
likely to provide accommodation, a source of 
profit and a means of labour control. The new 
gangmasters are, it seems, more likely to take 
advantage of the specific vulnerabilities of migrant 
workers. 
According to the director of the ornamentals 
company, there was “a continuous pattern of 
change in the world of gang labour”. “English 
gangmasters” had long supplied his company with 
white British workers from surrounding villages 
and regional towns. Sometimes the people they 
supplied were in receipt of state benefits and 
were working illegally. “They would disappear 
when the Home Office came on a raid.” These 
gangmasters had relations going back for 
generations with the company. However, the 
company had recently had gangs of workers 
provided by a “new kind of gangmaster...The 
modern day labour provider of the sort the 
vegetable trade is entirely reliant on and we are 
increasingly reliant on is a much bigger 
organisation with a mysterious unseen leader.”29 
                                               
29 Director, East ornamentals grower, August 2004. 
One of the permanent staff at the site put it like 
this: “The changes began in the 1990s. There was 
a lot of fiddling and greedy gangmasters....The 
volume got bigger and the number of gangs 
required increased. A group of young foreign 
workers ...would come in....and move around 
doing low skilled bulk jobs, like pruning and 
planting for two to three months” (Junior Manager 
and former worker, East ornamentals grower, 
August 2004). According to Kevin, the 
gangmaster whose business was tottering: “The 
future of gangmastering lies in foreign labour. 
Gangmasters that house workers are making 
money.”  
Lina, a Polish national, was employed by the new 
gangmaster at the fruit handling and floreting 
company. Until two weeks before the interview 
she and her boyfriend had lived in the village 
where the gangmaster was located. She had just 
moved to a nearby town where they now lived in 
houses rented from the gangmaster and were 
paying £45 per week each sharing a room with 
another worker. “It is not good”. They were now 
looking for a flat to rent separately. They had 
been looking with an agency but the agency 
insisted that Lina paid six months rent up front. 
However, she had learned through other workers 
at the site that “there are Pakistani people in 
Peterborough who don’t want a deposit, or want 
only two or three weeks’ deposit.” She intended 
to take that route. 
There was evidence that gangmasters were being 
used to increase worker output, another form of 
work-place intensification. Tony, a British national 
in his early forties had worked on a fruit farm in 
the east of England when he was younger. They 
had had “regular gangs in, all women. Gang hours 
were 8.30 to 2.30 or 3. Now there are more men 
in the gangs than women. [The ornamentals 
grower] is pushing gangs to longer hours which is 
no good for women with kids at school”. 
However, another worker, a Lithuanian national, 
found that the 2004 implementation of legislation 
on illegal working (The Immigration (Restrictions 
on Employment) Order) together with EU 
enlargement had changed the employment 
practices of some gangmasters for the better:   
“At the moment here [UK] is better. After 
May 1st I’m paying tax and insurance. 
Before it was different. All gangmasters 
took 10 per cent from wages. If you 
asked gangmasters then why they did not 
take tax and national insurance from 
wages, they would say ‘if you don’t like 
my job, you go’”  
(Eva, Lithuanian gang worker) 
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The case histories, albeit based on a very limited 
sample, suggest that growers were moving away 
from continuing reliance on relatively small 
gangmasters that are either locally based or 
committed to supplying a particular grower, to 
larger-scale gangmasters, operating at the 
regional or even national level, making their 
profits either from undetected illegal practices, a 
higher volume of trade, accommodation provision 
or a combination of these. This is suggestive of a 
move away from exploitation of workers via 
personalised relations with labour contractors and 
margins made from dodging employment law, to 
the provision of workers by larger gangs, and 
more anonymised relations between employee 
and employer. Such gangmasters are likely to 
have few qualms about dropping workers from 
the gang as grower businesses bring fine-tuned 
management to their deployment of labour.  
For accession country nationals, there are likely to 
have been advantages from EU enlargement and 
the associated change in their immigration status 
(see Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly and Spencer, op cit), 
and all workers in the sector may have benefited 
from the Gangmaster (Licensing) Act. Yet, in as 
much as the pressure on margins faced by the 
small-scale gangmasters I spoke to is experienced 
by all gangmasters, there is likely to be a 
continuing squeeze on workers. This can be seen 
through the changing operation of labour 
arrangements based on piece rates. 
Piece rates 
 
‘Let us now look a little more closely at the 
characteristic peculiarities of piece-wages. The 
quality of the labour is here controlled by the 
work itself, which must be of good average 
quality if the piece-price is to be paid in full. 
Piece-wages become, from this point of view, the 
most fruitful source of reductions in wages, and of 
frauds committed by the capitalists. This is 
because they provide an exact measure of the 
intensity of labour......the quality and intensity of 
the work are here controlled by the very form of 
the wage....Given the system of piece-wages, it is 
naturally in the personal interest of the worker 
that he should strain his labour-power as 
intensely as possible; this in turn enables the 
capitalist to raise the normal degree of intensity of 
labour more easily. Moreover, the length of the 
working day is now in the personal interest of the 
worker, since with it his daily or weekly wages 
rise’ (Marx 1867 (1976): 694-696) 
 
In England and Wales, wage payments to workers 
in agriculture are subject to minimum hourly rates 
governed by the Agricultural Wages Board 
(AWB).30 In contrast to the detailed regulation of 
hourly wages, for which agriculture continues to 
be regarded as a special case, there is no 
specification of piece rates according to crop, task 
or season. Instead, government policy requires 
that piece rates be set such  that a workers’ 
earnings equate each day to at least the relevant 
minimum wage for that worker, taking account of 
the number of hours worked.  
A small-scale strawberry grower in the south east 
claimed to follow these rules. She said she used 
piece rates as motivators when there “was a 
massive amount of fruit....We’ll always work out 
that they could earn more doing it that way, that 
they would earn enough to cover the minimum 
wage”. Although the use of piece rates in British 
agriculture long predated the current wave of 
foreign nationals working in the sector,31 for 
another strawberry grower of similar size, there 
was a connection. British nationals were not 
willing to put in the hard work:  
“let’s face it, it’s hard graft out there, you 
know, picking strawberries....it’s piece 
work too, and you know, people just 
aren’t used to that. They’ve got a very 
cushy lifestyle as an employee in Britain 
and that’s what they’ve been brought up 
to expect. The other groups have got no 
such illusions. They come along and 
think, ‘this is my opportunity to make 
money’ and they take it. The difference is, 
I have an English person who is making 
less than minimum wage, which means 
that I’ve then got to make up the 
difference to make it legal and that 
means the price that I’m having to pay to 
get a punnet of strawberries might be  26 
to 30 pence per pound. And I’ve got 
                                               
30 The AWB, which includes union, employer and 
government representatives, meets to set new rates 
each year. The AWB rate for ‘standard workers’ has 
exceeded the National Minimum Wage (NMW) each 
year since the latter was introduced in 1997. However, 
the wages of workers not classified as agricultural 
workers, such as those predominantly employed in 
packhouse and primary processing work are regulated 
by the NMW rather than the AWB rates. Since 2003, 
AWB’s Manual Harvest Worker rate has applied to 
agricultural workers employed on a temporary casual 
basis for harvesting work only. At the time of the 
interviews in 2004, the minimum hourly  rates were: 
AWB Standard Worker rate (19 years and over) £5.15; 
AWB Manual Harvest Worker rate (19 years and over) 
£4.50; NMW (18-21 years) £3.80 and (22 years and 
over) £4.50. 
31 Indeed piece rates are common currency in the 
agricultural sector worldwide (see Ortiz, 2002). 
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another guy on piece work [at the same 
rate] getting 18 pence a pound, making 
[£10 an hour, from Lithuania or Estonia or 
wherever” 
(owner-cultivator of strawberries, West 
Midlands, May 2004) 
The east Midlands salads grower also saw piece 
rates and the employment of international 
migrant workers as part of a package: 
“I accept [piece work is] a very crude way 
of motivating people, but it works, and I 
don’t see anything shameful about 
that....These people come here for 
economic reasons in the main, and not 
only that, they are going to fund their 
own education, or they are going to 
struggle very hard. Here, they have the 
opportunity to earn good money”  
(April 2004) 
Filip, the Polish worker who had returned to the 
ornamentals company after a five year gap, felt 
that the increase in foreign workers was 
connected to the availability of piece rates. “There 
is an increase in foreign workers mainly due to 
the money workers can make, and employers can 
make better money from them... Foreign workers, 
because of the piece rate, will work much faster 
as well”.32 
Taken as a whole, our interviews suggest that 
piece rates, long used for harvest work, have 
played an important part in the intensification of 
work-place regimes. Firstly, there is some 
evidence that they have been introduced for tasks 
previously paid at a time rate to speed up work 
and enhance labour control. Secondly, there is 
evidence of decline in the rates themselves linked 
to the reduced margins growers have been 
obtaining from retailers for each unit of produce. 
A sweet-corn grower in the south-east of England 
brought in piece rates to accompany 
mechanisation of harvesting: 
“the problem with sweetcorn [plants] six 
foot high [is] you could never tell if 
[workers] got lost and they’d come and 
ask for another stint. It was a nightmare 
[to know]...whether they had actually 
done it or [got] fed up with it and just 
picked a little bit around the bin.....[Now] 
they get paid by the bin, it’s quite hard 
work....and you would make them go 
from one end of the field to the other so 
you could identify precisely whose row 
                                               
32 interviewed August 2004. 
[had been picked by whom].....so [you] 
could give those that didn’t do a good job 
a warning and you also knew which bins 
they picked”  
(April 2004) 
Whereas this sweetcorn grower measured and 
remunerated the work of individuals, Deep, the 
gangmaster supplying workers to the West 
Midlands salad onions company, paid piece rates 
according to the output of the group. Deep 
received payment from the grower per box of 
harvested and field-prepared onions. The grower 
had told us that the price they received per unit 
had declined in cash terms by two-sevenths 
between 1999 and 2004. This pressure had been 
passed onto Deep through a reduction in piece 
rates. For one type of harvesting and field 
preparation process, Deep said the rate had 
declined from £8 per box in 1999 to £7.20 in 
2003. Whereas in that year he claimed he had 
paid the workers £6.50 per box, in 2004 he had 
started at £6 and reduced the rate to £5.50 within 
two months.33 
One manifestation of intensification was the 
search for workers who were able and willing to 
work with care and effort to turn a declining piece 
rate into at least the national minimum wage. For 
Conrad, senior manager at the east of England 
ornamentals company, this meant somebody “not 
too young because they are not driven 
enough....somebody who has got material needs.” 
Because of the minimum wage floor, the SAWS 
workers that the ornamentals company had been 
using were  
“underperforming everyday....Apart from 
the individuals who have a drive to work, 
and want to save as much as they can, 
and there are some, the others take 
advantage of the minimum wage as a 
cushion. The piece rate can’t pay less for 
less. It pays only more money for more 
work. We need to look for people who 
can respond to incentives.”  
According to Alice, a gangmaster, piece rates at 
this grower had declined by fifteen per cent since 
1998. That there had been a reduction was born 
out by the junior manager, Sabrina, who had 
herself been a piece worker when she had worked 
in a gang on the site in the 1980s. She 
remembered having been able to earn the 
equivalent of a day’s pay in a morning. “You 
should be getting a day’s pay by lunch... 
                                               
33 He explained that the change in the rate during the 
season was justified by workers’ increased speed as 
they became used to the task. 
 13
rates...have gone down to make people work 
harder for their money.” Sabrina reported that in 
2004, workers on piece rates only just made their 
day’s wages after a full day’s work. If they worked 
overtime, the rate did not change. “In my day I 
still worked well in the afternoon but didn’t kill 
myself...” Now workers “might not even make 
their wage.” 
Piece rates can be used by employers to undercut 
statutory minimum wages (Gidwani, 2001). The 
translation of earnings from piece rates into less 
than the minimum wage was acknowledged as an 
effect (rather than an intention) by Richard, 
senior manager at a strawberry growing company 
in the south of England. However, work-place 
intensification here had come more from the way 
in which picking was now organised than an 
explicit reduction in the rate paid. Supermarket 
retailers issued increasingly precise specification 
for the quality of produce. Strawberries now had 
to be more carefully size-graded to within a five 
mm band. Richard claimed that because workers 
now took longer to pick the same number of 
berries, the company had raised the rate per unit.  
Richard had joined the company in 2001 and had 
led the switch to growing a mixture of fruit for 
fresh and processing uses. Before the change, 
people had worked relatively slowly and queued 
to check in their produce. Now, “weak pickers” 
were identified early and made into runners so 
“strong pickers” could focus on “making as much 
money as they can”.34 The new work-place 
regime involved “paying attention to detail and 
doing it right.” Trolleys had been introduced 
instead of trays, fruit was checked in on a bar 
code system and each pallet was scanned. The 
calculation of daily earnings for each worker was 
downloaded from handheld devices onto a 
computer. 
White British caravanners at the strawberry 
grower’s site worked under a different regime 
from the SAWS workers, who were hired for the 
fresh berry harvest. The caravanners only picked 
fruit for processing. One caravanner, Karen, 
observed people vary their working days. During 
the strawberry harvest she worked two to five 
hours per day. Her detailed notes revealed per 
hour wage equivalents in 2004 varying from £2.45 
to £4.90.35 However, it was not only caravanners 
                                               
34 The introduction of polytunnels had also meant that 
picking was no longer so subject to interruption by bad 
weather. 
35 Caravanners we interviewed did not raise objections 
to such rates because their presence at the site was 
largely recreational and they received free sites for the 
whole summer in return for a minimum of just eight 
hours picking. 
who could end up with low earnings from 
strawberry picking. Marta, a SAWS worker and a 
PhD student studying engineering in Russia, 
reported earning just £6 on her worst day of the 
season after working for three to four hours. 
Richard told us he had been advised by a 
horticultural  industry group to record less hours 
worked in such cases.  
The six SAWS workers interviewed were 
ambivalent about the intensity of work involved in 
picking strawberries on a piece rate basis. All 
talked about maximizing their earnings over the 
period of the SAWS permit. Marta, now on her 
second season as a SAWS worker, preferred the 
employment she had had the previous year. 
“There were seventeen students - much better 
accommodation....you got work for more hours 
and on more days. Sometimes there were no days 
off in a week....I earned more than £6000 
because we worked a lot, sometimes twelve hour 
days with no days off”. Vincent, a Rwandan 
medical student, studying in Ukraine, came to 
Britain on the SAWS scheme with the aim of 
saving £2000. So far he had earned £2500 and 
saved £1800 of it. He spent £10 per week on 
food. 
However, all the students found the strawberry 
harvesting very hard work, and were relieved at 
least occasionally to work in the processing 
factory on a time rate, which meant lower 
earnings, but was, according to Eugenia, a 
Bulgarian law student, a “little rest”. She said that 
strawberry picking was “a difficult job...I know I 
have to work and I just knew that it will be 
hard....strawberry picking is not good for the 
back”. What Eugenia most objected to was the 
intense supervision. If the tray of strawberries 
was underweight or there was a high incidence of 
bruising, “the supervisor shouts your number” 
which is “not pleasant”. 
In his study of piece-work in Indian agriculture, 
Gidwani found group-based piece work to be 
higher status for some groups of workers and less 
damaging to their self-esteem than more 
individualised employment relations such as these 
(2001). However, at the fruit handling and 
brassica floreting site, group-based rates did not 
have this effect as they were not known by 
workers. Payment by the director was calculated 
according to output but the Yorkshire 
gangmaster, Simon, claimed he was not told the 
rate. The director, “has got his own system”. A 
Lithuanian worker, Susan, working for another 
gangmaster, said similarly that she thought it was 
piece work but did not know how the rates were 
calculated. Jim, a white British ex-miner in his 40s 
said the rate was “30 to 40 pence per box of 
apples, and more or less the same for oranges, I 
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think”. He collected his wages from the 
gangmaster’s mother’s house in his village. 
While neither British nor foreign nationals were 
told actual piece rates at the handling and 
floreting site, some British workers at the 
ornamentals company working on hourly rates 
were resentful of the piece rates they saw being 
paid to foreign nationals. According to Alice, her 
“workers get angry when they see the foreigners 
doing a lot of piece work”. One worker told us 
that when a gang of foreign nationals working on 
piece rates had come into despatch, the company 
cut the overtime available by half. It seems that 
at the ornamentals site, the extension of piece 
rates in the work-place regime may also have 
enhanced labour control through creating envy 
between groups of workers. 
Overall, the data suggest that both the 
introduction of piece rates (for work roles 
previously paid at an hourly rate) and reductions 
in the rates themselves have been important 
innovations to increase labour control for 
horticultural businesses and labour contractors. 
The indirect regulation of piece rates via the 
notional calculation of an hourly minimum wage, 
together with ever tighter ‘quality’ criteria, 
encouraged further intensification through 
increasing the speed, care and effort required to 
meet the minimum earnings target. There is 
evidence that some workers found it hard to 
achieve this target some of the time and earned 
less than the hourly minimum they were entitled 
to. Yet, workers were ambivalent about piece 
rates, with a strong strand of opinion welcoming 
the ‘opportunity’ to maximise earnings.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has used case histories from the 
British horticultural sector to suggest an ongoing 
process of change towards intensification of work-
place regimes. It appears to be evidenced by 
growers’ search for certain types of worker, who, 
seeking to maximise earnings, are willing to work 
hard to close, detailed instructions, and are 
available for the amount of time required and no 
more. For some growers, this could mean workers 
that are willing to accept being informed of the 
availability of work only the night before for an 
uncertain number of hours, while for others it 
may involve finding workers that will stay for a 
number of weeks or months,36 or including some 
that can themselves be used as instruments of 
labour control. At root, the drive for intensification 
                                               
36 Business sometimes requires a captive labor force, 
which is not necessarily delivered by mobile workers 
(Mitchell, 2005: 85). 
has been caused largely by corporate retailers’ 
regulation of work-place regimes in the sector 
through their requirements for volume, ‘quality’ 
and low margins (for growers). To create the 
workforce they need to fulfil this in the twenty-
first century, growers have significantly increased 
the proportion of international migrant workers 
employed in the sector. They have ratcheted up 
the effort required from workers to achieve the 
minimum wage through the introduction of piece 
work to new areas and pushed down the rates 
earned per unit output. Some growers using 
gangmasters have switched to a reliance on large-
scale operators, seen as more likely to provide the 
‘right kind of worker’. 
In spite of the power of corporate retailers in this 
process, the British state too has had an 
important influence on changing agricultural 
work-place regimes. Indeed the two are 
inseparable as the rise of supermarket power over 
the last fifty years has been enabled by the 
retailers’ relation with the state, ranging from 
government-funded visits by directors of Tesco 
and Sainsbury to the U.S. after World War Two to 
study emerging multiple grocery stores there, 
through the end of resale price maintenance in 
the 1960s following intense supermarket pressure 
(Bevan, 2005) to the passing of the Food Safety 
Act. More recently, the state allowed Wal-Mart, 
the world’s largest retailer, into the UK sector and 
made no effective regulatory response to 
evidence of oligopsony buyer power in 
supermarket-supplier relations in the 2000 
Competition Commission report on supermarkets 
(Lawrence, op cit). Among the interests at play 
here, the state has a political interest in reducing 
food prices (and retail price inflation in general),37 
and retailers have been handed a lead role in 
bringing this about.  
However, as we have seen, the structure of 
retailer demand for fresh fruit and vegetables has 
provided opportunities for growers that are able 
to fulfil the necessary requirements, through 
growth in volume. The demand for foreign 
workers has meant valued employment and 
earnings for some of those workers. The state as 
regulator of migration policy has also had more 
than one kind of impact on work-place regimes. 
Foreign nationals came with a variety of 
immigration statuses (eg ‘illegally’ resident, SAWS 
worker, EU accession country national on the 
Workers’ Registration Scheme) with different 
implications for labour control. The SAWS scheme 
and (in a very different way) ‘illegal’ working 
seem to favour growers by effectively constraining 
                                               
37 Financial Times, 18th February 2005, p3. 
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workers’ labour market mobility, while the free 
movement components of European Union 
enlargement and the new status of accession 
country worker have, for some foreign nationals, 
enhanced their capacity to seek jobs across the 
economy (Anderson, Ruhs, Rogaly and Spencer, 
op cit), and to seek redress in instances of 
employment abuse. 
This begins to hint at some of the complexity 
involved in developing a national picture of 
agricultural employment relations involving 
migrant workers, especially in a period of rapid 
change. As Martin put it in relation to the U.S., 
“[a]griculture is a ...diverse employer...so there is 
a wide variety of employer-employee 
relationships” (Martin, 1988: op cit: 11). Class 
dynamics in agriculture are further complicated by 
the contradictory class position of many growers, 
that, facing one way, see value being 
appropriated by those who buy their produce, 
and, facing the other, seek ever more intensified 
work-place regimes to maximise the surplus value 
from their workforce. With regard to labour 
contractors, some “are honest brokers between 
growers and workers and many are not” (ibid: 
130).  An understanding of why certain kinds of 
production relations prevail under particular 
conditions “involves exposing the heterogeneity 
and fluidity of social and institutional forms of 
economic activity and assessing how space 
influences outcomes” (Marsden, Munton, Ward 
and Whatmore (op cit: 362).  
Thus a first step for further research in Britain on 
the relationships I have explored in this paper, 
would be the development of studies of labour 
relations in the production of particular 
commodities. The turnover time of capital is not 
constant across agriculture, nor even across the 
horticultural subsector. At the most basic level, 
there are likely to be important differences 
between crops with a single short annual harvest, 
and those which are picked across many months, 
between work-place regimes involving field-work 
alone and those where packhouse and primary 
processing work also feature. Miriam Wells’ study 
of the labour process involved in strawberry 
production in California is a model in this regard. 
Within her study of strawberry production, Wells 
meticulously differentiates between labour 
relations in four different valleys. Guthman’s work 
is equally impressive for its spatial analysis of 
organic food production in California, though, 
unlike Wells, she did not systematically interview 
workers.38 A new generation of British studies of 
                                               
38 Nor, suprisingly, did Bauder in his recent analysis of 
the Canadian scheme for the temporary migration of 
Mexican agricultural workers (2006). It is most likely for 
agricultural work-place regimes could also focus 
on localities and regions to try to explain 
differences associated with space, and on the 
significance of the scale of growers’ businesses. 
Alongside such studies, ethnographic work 
involving long term engagement and time spent 
alongside workers (both foreign and British 
nationals), and where possible growers and 
gangmasters too, is needed to elucidate migration 
histories, and the consequences of interaction 
between differently positioned individuals and 
groups of workers for worker solidarity and/ or 
further labour market segmentation. Future 
academic research could have an important role 
in undermining the commodity fetishism entailed 
in rendering working conditions in horticulture 
invisible and irrelevant to ‘consumers’. It can also 
play its part in countering misrepresentations and 
over-generalisations of agricultural workers’ 
positions either as an exploited and powerless 
class, or as free individuals following ever 
increasing opportunities for employment and 














                                                                        
this reason that both he and Guthman reach rather 
undifferentiated conclusions about aspects of work-
place regime, in Guthman’s case regarding labor 
contractors and in Bauder’s on the subject of the 
undesirability of temporary mobility schemes. Unlike 
even the British Trades Union Congress, which, after 
interviews with Ukrainian SAWS workers, argued in 
favour of reform (Trades Union Congress, 2004), 
Bauder saw such schemes as inherently regressive in 
creating a second-tier citizenship. See also Ngai (2004).  
39 Indeed, variations between seasons in the 
importance of timeliness of labor supply can shift the 
relative power of workers and growers across the year. 
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